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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new methods enabling anonymous om-
muniation on the Internet. We desribe a new protool
that allows us to reate an anonymous overlay network by
exploiting the web browsing ativities of regular users. We
show that the overlay network provides an anonymity set
greater than the set of senders and reeivers in a realisti
threat model. In partiular, the protool provides unob-
servability in our threat model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communiation Networks℄: General
Seurity and protetion; K.4.1 [Computers and Soiety℄:
Publi Poliy IssuesPrivay
General Terms
Seurity
Keywords
Covert hannel, HTTP, mix network, anonymity
1. INTRODUCTION
Privay on the Internet gains importane as most network
ativity an be linked to a user's identity. Proposed solutions
that use Chaumian mixes show ertain tra patterns if not
every user runs a node in the system. We desribe a realisti
threat model and present a new set of protools that allow
unobservable ommuniation.
In 1981, David Chaum presented the onept of mixes, a
protool to provide senderreeiver unlinkability under stan-
dard ryptographi assumptions. Unlinkability means that
an observer does not learn anything to improve her guesses
on who ommuniates with whom (The apriori probability
of two entities being related is equal to the aposteriori prob-
ability). The notion of the anonymity set is essential when
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measuring anonymity. It is the set of all possible subjets
who might ause an ation [27℄. In the ontext of lassi-
al ommuniation protools, it onsists of the senders and
reeivers.
Currently employed implementations of mix networks are,
for example, the Cypherpunks [34℄ and Mixmaster [32℄ re-
mailers and the nasent Mixminion projet [13℄. Chaum's
work motivated other shemes whih avoid expensive de-
ryption at eah step, to minimize delay, for example, Crowds
[36℄ and Onion Routing [22℄.
In pratie, most users of these systems do not run mix
nodes themselves. They ause tra patterns to and from
the set of mix nodes, whih a global, passive adversary an
use to redue the anonymity provided by the systems. Possi-
ble attaks by suh an observer inlude intersetion, timing
and paket ounting attaks on remailers and other systems
derived from Chaumian mixes [11, 3, 35℄. Suggested so-
lutions introdue over tra into the protools. This is
ahieved mainly by having the senders injet dummy mes-
sages [7℄, whih are disarded at some mix.
Unobservability is a stronger property than unlinkability,
meaning that an observer annot tell if messages are being
sent or reeived at all.
This paper presents tehniques to enlarge the anonymity
set by inluding noninvolved subjets who provide over
tra for the protool in question. Our approah is to hide
ommuniation within transit tra going through HTTP
browsers.
In our model, the adversary annot distinguish senders or
reeivers in the hidden protool from other HTTP users on-
tating the same set of servers. This enlarges the anonymity
set beyond senders and reeivers and provides unobservabil-
ity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2,
we dene our adversary model. Setion 3 briey introdues
Chaumian mixes and explains why HTTP is a good hoie of
over protool. Related work is examined in Setion 4. Se-
tion 5 desribes a new lass of overt hannels inside HTTP
whih allow ommuniation between servers under the over
of usergenerated tra. To show how these hannels an
be put to use in a Chaumian mix, we present a simple pro-
tool in Setion 6. Unsolved problems and areas for future
researh are disussed in Setion 7. We onlude with Se-
tion 8.
2. THREAT MODEL
To mount the timing and intersetion attaks against many
employed systems, the observer only needs to inspet the
headers in the layers below the appliation layer of the TCP/IP
stak at seleted points on the Internet.
This preisely mathes the apabilities of urrent (legal)
teleommuniation surveillane. To ite the CALEA
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plementation Setion of the FBI:
examine[ing℄ the full paket stream and examine
protool layers higher than layer 3 would plae a
high load on existing network elements in most
arhitetures. [41℄.
The speiation of tra data in the EU Convention
on Cyberrime [12℄ indiates that the intended mandatory
surveillane by internet servie providers is restrited to the
lower three layers of the TCP/IP stak.
We grant our adversary the additional ability to inspet
appliation layer headers. This adversary model orresponds
to an observer who is datamining tra logs for liques of
ommuniating people. This is a realisti and impending
threat.
3. BACKGROUND
In Chaumian mixes, nodes relay messages for eah other.
Eah node has a (public key, private key) pair. To send a
message along a hain of relaying mixes through the mix
overlay network, the address of the nal reipient is attahed
to the message. The result is enrypted with the publi key
of the last node in the hain. The address of the node is
attahed to the result and the proess repeated for eah
node along the hosen path toward the rst. On reeipt of
a message, a node derypts it and  if it is not the nal
reipient itself  forwards it to the node speied in the
derypted text.
Later improvements on Chaum's sheme suggest random
delays, various strategies to proess and subsequently dis-
path messages (ushing) [32, 26, 35℄, reordering of mes-
sages in the pool, padding the messages to a xed size after
deryption, and other improvements to ensure unlinkability.
Although reently ontributed shemes (e.g. MorphMix
[37℄, GNUnet's GAP [4℄ or Tarzan [19℄) require users to
transport tra for other users, many deployed Chaumian
mixes and derived systems suer from the problem that most
users do not  or perhaps annot  run nodes in the sys-
tems themselves. They may be hindered by Network Ad-
dress Translation [40℄, dynami  and therefore unstable 
IP addresses or restritive rewalling poliies. This greatly
weakens the ahievable anonymity, as a passive adversary
an observe tra patterns leading to and oming from the
mix network.
To thwart tra analysis, we suggest hiding the proto-
ol inside the wellestablished HyperText Transfer Proto-
ol (HTTP[25, 18℄). Aording to reent measurements[31℄,
HTTP aounts for the highest perentage of data on the In-
ternet, only slightly less than FastTrak's [15℄ PeertoPeer
protool.
Using HTTP as over tra brings another advantage.
There is already an extensive body of researh, and sev-
eral implementations, whih aim at providing some degree
of anonymity for HTTP lients in the presene of various
1
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adversaries, see for example [36℄, [2℄, [20℄ and [6℄. These
tehniques an be employed to enhane unlinkability.
HTTP is a lientserver protool. At rst, this seems to
imply that hidden data an only be forwarded through a
hain of alternating lients and servers, all of whih have
to be partiipants of the hidden network. We will show,
however, that ommuniation between servers is feasable
through standard weblients whih need not be part of the
ommunity using the overt protool.
4. RELATED WORK
The onept of overt hannels was introdued by B. Lamp-
son in 1973 [29℄. Covert hannels in the network and trans-
port layers of the TCP/IP protool were examined by Row-
land [38℄ and Fisk et al. [17℄. Using HTTP as substrate for
other appliation level protools is disussed in RFC 3205
[33℄, where only overt enapsulation of protools is onsid-
ered, naturally. There are several tools that tunnel protools
through HTTP, mostly for irumvention of rewalls, for ex-
ample, Lars Brinkho's httptunnel [8℄. These tools an be
used to disguise any protool as HTTP tra, but the set of
entities in whih to hide (the anonymity set [27℄) onsists of
just the sender and reeiver, whereas the onstrutions listed
in Setion 5 use real over tra, involving unwitting web
surfers as over. In Infranet [16℄, overt hannels in HTTP
are used to irumvent webensorship. Web servers parti-
ipating in the Infranet reeive hidden requests for ensored
web pages and return the pages' ontent steganographially
hidden in harmless images. Goldberg and Wagner's TAZ
and rewebber network [21℄ implements anonymous publish-
ing based on HTTP.
In [6℄, the authors briey touh on the subjet of unob-
servability, but onlude that real users would inadvertedly
destroy this property. Surveys suh as Raymond's [35℄ men-
tion the onept, but do not point to protools that provide
it.
5. SERVER–TO–SERVER CHANNEL
THROUGH UNWITTING CLIENTS
In this setion, we explain how HTTP servers an om-
muniate through lients without the onsent or knowledge
of the user. This onstitutes a new lass of overt hannel,
whih transports data indiretly. The main mehanisms in-
side HTTP/HTML that allow suh data transmissions are:
1. Redirets
2. Cookies
3. Referer
2
headers
4. HTML elements
5. Ative Content
These features an be employed as follows:
5.0.1 Redirects
Redirets (RFC 2616 303 messages [25℄) are used to
refer the lient to another loation. The loation an be
the URL of a CGI sript, with optional parameters in the
QUERY_STRING [9℄. This allows CGI sripts to send data in
2
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said parameters to other CGI sripts through the browsers of
unwitting web surfers. This hannel's apaity is restrited
to 1024 URLenoded bytes [5℄.
5.0.2 Cookies
Cookies onstitute a mehanism to keep state information
on the lient side. To advise the lient to keep a (key,value)
pair for further ommuniation, a server sends a Set-Cookie:
header in the reply to a request. The value part is allowed
to be up to 4 kilobytes long, and the standard speies that
a lient must be able to store up to a maximum of 40 ookies
per server. In the servertoserver ontext, we an use op-
tional features to transport data between the servers. The
denition of ookies in RFC 2109 [28℄ denes a protool sub
eld domain whih arries information about what group of
web servers the ookie is to be sent to. The RFC states
that the domain must ontain at least two dots if it ends in
a threeletter Top Level Domain (TLD) and at least three
dots if it ends in a twoletter TLD. There are a many free
Dynami DNS servies online, most of whih provide host-
names in domains with this property, e.g., all hostnames in
the zone administered by dyndns.org are in the same ookie
domain. If a CGI sript on server foo.dyndns.org sends a
ookie of the form
KEY = VALUE; domain = .dyndns.org; Path = /;
to a browser and the browser onnets to server
bar.dyndns.org, then bar will get foo's (key,value) pair. To
get the browser to request data objets from bar.dyndns.org,
the doument requested from foo ould ontain one of the
tags mentioned below under HTML elements, or ontains
ative ontent that requests data from bar automatially.
5.0.3 Referer
Referer headers ontain the loation of the web page or
sript that linked to the presently requested one. Sine the
naming of ontents an be hosen arbitrarily by a server
 and fored upon the browser by automati requests as
desribed below in subsetion 5.0.4  this is another hannel
between servers through unwitting browsers. The length
restrition of redirets applies here, too.
5.0.4 HTML Elements
The HyperText Markup Language (HTML) version 4 on-
tains elements that ause most browsers to automatially
request given douments from HTTP servers. The following
HTML tags and attributes have this property:
• frame sr=URL Indiates a part of a frameset.
• iframe sr=URL Denes an embedded frame.
• img sr=URL Denes an inline image.
• sript sr=URL Indiates that JavaSript (see below)
funtions for this page should be loaded from URL.
• link href=URL Indiates outofband information for
the urrent page.
• objet sr=URL Denes an embeddedmultimedia ob-
jet to load.
• applet odebase=URL Indiates that Java (see below)
lasses for this page should be loaded from URL.
• embed sr=URL Denes an embedded multimedia ob-
jet to load.
• layer sr=URL Denes a transparent layer of this page.
If the HTML doument is reated by a CGI sript, the URL
value in the tags above an be set to ontain the address of
another sript together with parameters.
The <META HTTP-EQUIV> tag/attribute allows embedding
of HTTP protool header elds in the body of an HTTP
message. This is useful for our purposes, beause the header
thus embedded in the body esapes the inspetion of our
adversary dened in Setion 2. Interesting appliations in
our ontext are:
• Redirets (return ode 303 [25℄) inside suessful replies
(return ode 500):
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Refresh"
CONTENT="3;URL=http://www.some.org/some.html">
This line of HTML auses the browser to request
some.html from www.some.org after 3 seonds.
• Setting ookies without a SetCookie header:
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Set-Cookie"
CONTENT="key=value;path=/;domain=.dyndns.org">
This line sets a ookie on the browser, whih will be
transmitted to every server in the dyndns.org sub
domain to whih the browser subsequently onnets.
5.0.5 Active Content
Soalled Ative Content is ode that is exeuted on
the lient. Currently used languages for ative ontent are
SUN's Java [24℄, Netsape's JavaSript [10℄, Maromedia's
Flash [1℄ and Mirosoft's AtiveX [30℄, the latter being re-
strited to a single browser, so it will not be disussed here.
In Java's design, onsiderable eort was made to make the
exeution of untrusted ode on the lient seure. Java's seu-
rity framework inhibits onnetions to servers diering from
the one whih supplied the running applet, so it annot be
used to transmit data to dierent servers. Of the remain-
ing two languages, we hose Javasript, beause it is more
widespread and better doumented. Running ode on un-
suspeting surfer's mahines opens a number of hannels of
varying bandwidth between sripts on servers. To name two
examples:
• It is trivial to program redirets to CGI sripts (with
parameters) in JavaSript.
• A sript may onstrut an invisible FORM [42℄, ll the
elds with data and send all of it to a CGI sript in
the body of a POST request without user interation.
This hannel allows almost arbitrarily large payloads.
All the above mehanisms are heavily relied on by authors
of HTML douments and CGI sripts.
6. THE MUTED POSTHORN — A CHAU-
MIAN MIX ON BANNER ADVERTS
To demonstrate how a anonymous messaging protool an
use HTTP as over tra to ahieve unobservability against
our adversary, we present a simple Chaumian mix.
6.1 The Setup
In our variant of Chaum's protool, the Muted Posthorn,
four (not neessarily disjoint) groups of entities are involved:
The node maintainers provide CGI sripts on HTTP
servers. The sripts work as mix nodes and so every
sript has a (publickey, secretkey) pair and a pool for
messages to be forwarded. A sript is alled with the
message as the parameter of a POST request. The
sripts work as in Chaum's mix networks, i.e. on re-
eipt of a message, they derypt it and look at headers
speifying further proessing. In our simple protool,
there are three possible ations, forwarding the mes-
sage to another node, storing the message in a loal
mailbox with a supplied name (a 128 bit number), and
sending the ontent of a given mailbox bak to the re-
questing HTTP lient. The outward visible ation of
the sripts is to return either an HTML doument with
JavaSipt ode that submits data to another node, or
a short, stati HTML doument.
The linkers maintain web pages whih all seem to ontain
the same small ion or banner advert. They do this
by inluding an iframe whih inludes a frameset on
one of the nodes. The frameset onsists of a frame
with the image and a seond, invisible frame. This
frame is reated by a node and either ontains the
JavaSript ode that does the atual transport, or the
short HTML doument.
The senders and reeivers use this setup to ommuni-
ate enrypted messages. Senders onstrut messages
as in reent mix networks, e.g. Mixmaster [32℄, but the
nal delivery address of a message is always a mailbox
on a node, and speial ations must be taken for the
rst hop in a hain. A message thus onstruted is
sent to the rst of the nodes in the hain by sending
a POST request to a sript. Reeivers must pull their
mailboxes. They do this by sending enrypted send
mailbox number N requests to the nodes where they
keep mailboxes.
Hapless web surfers just visit the pages maintained by
the linkers. Their browsers exeute the JavaSript
ode returned by the node, transfering messages in the
proess.
6.2 A first Version
A simple variant of our protool uses two kinds of mes-
sages:
To: messages ontain enrypted messages to nodes in the
network.
Get: messages request mailboxes from nodes.
Messages are always padded to a xed length with random-
ness. When preparing a message m0 for a sequene of nodes
ni, the sender reursively omputes
mi+1 = To :||ni||Eni(mi).
where En(m) enrypts message m for n's publi key. For
the last node, the To header is omitted. The sender submits
the enrypted message to the last node in a POST request.
A reeiving node tries to derypt the message with its se-
ret key. If deryption sueeds, the resulting text is parsed
for headers.
If it is a Get message, the node looks up the requested
mailbox. If it exists, the node throws a oin. On 0, the on-
tent is sent  through the requesting lient  as a message
to a random node in the mix network. The lient an ex-
trat the message, for example, from its loal browser ahe.
On 1, a xed HTML response is sent to the lient. If the
mailbox does not exist, again a oin is tossed, this time to
deide whether to send a randomly hosen message from the
pool through the lient or the HTML response.
If it is a To message, the address is examined. If it is a
mailbox number, the message is stored in it. If the addressee
is a URL, the message is put in the message pool for further
delivery. Again, a oin throw deides whether a randomly
hosen message from the pool or the xed HTML response
is returned to the lient.
Against a passive observer as the adversary dened in
Setion 2, this protool provides unobservability. Senders of
messages and requesters of mailboxes send HTTP GET re-
quests as any harmless lient. Upon reeipt of the JavaSript
doument, they substitute their own messages for the ones
set inside the JavaSript ode, and then let the browser
exeute the ode. An observer who is restrited to the
IP/TCP/HTTP headers thus annot distinguish between
harmless browsers and senders/reeivers. This inreases the
anonymity set by the noninvolved web surfers.
6.3 DoS attack on the first protocol
The simple protool above is suseptible to a trivial de-
nial of servie attak. An adversary an simply request the
frameset from a node repeatedly to drain its message pool.
To defend against this attak, we introdue aknowledge-
ments for reeived messages (ACKs) between the nodes.
Eah message is kept in the pool and is resent until an
ACK for the message is reeived. ACKs are not sent imme-
diatly, but are put in the message pool themselves.
An ACK should be tied to the message it aknowledges
and to the node the message was addressed to, to avoid
forged ACKs and replays. The standard approah would
be to sign ACKs with the node's seret key. But deploying
digital signatures at all would imply that the nodes know
eah other's publi keys. Experiene with remailers, how-
ever, shows that knowledge about suh a global state of the
mix network is hard to ahieve. For this reason we would
like to avoid all publi key operations at the nodes, exept
deryption.
Our suggestion is to send the hash of the derypted text as
ACK to the previous node (to make them indistinguishable
from other messages, ACKs are padded with randomness to
the xed message size). The original sender knows all in-
termediate messages on the path, sine she onstruts them
layer by layer. So she an inform every node on the path
about what ACK to expet. She does this by inluding the
ACKs as values of additional Ak headers. The rule for on-
struting the next layer is now:
mi+1 = To :||ni||Ack :||h(mi)||Eni(mi).
A node keeps three tables: the message pool of outgoing
messages, a list of outstanding ACKs and a list of mailboxes
(see gure 1).
Ack:
To: node2 PadE_node2(mess2)
To: node1  E_node1(mess1) Pad 0x123456
0xabcdef
mbox2: message_b Pad
mbox1: Padmessage_a
Mailboxes:
ack1, ack2 PadAck: node2
Message Pool:
Figure 1: The internal state of a node: message pool
with messages and aknowledgements for reeived
messages, ACK table with outstanding ACKs and
referenes to messages in the pool, and the mail-
boxes.
On reeipt of a message, a node heks if it is an aknowl-
edgement. This is done by inspeting the rst |h()| bits
of the message, where h is the ryptographi hash funtion
used for ACKs. The resulting blok is heked against the
table of outstanding ACKs. If the blok mathes, the ACK
itself and the message orresponding to it are removed from
the table and the pool, respetively. Note that the URL of
the sending node is transmitted by the lient in the Referer
header.
When proessing To messages, the node now reates an
entry in its ACK table with the value of the Ak header.
The node omputes the hash of the derypted message and
onstruts an ACK message for the node that sent the mes-
sage
6.4 Properties of the Protocol
The protool inherits pratial advantages from HTTP.
All transations of senders, reeivers and unwitting web
surfers an be performed through HTTP anonymizing sys-
tems suh as Anonymizer [2℄, Crowds [36℄ or JAP [6℄.
The protool's tra is typially not bloked or modied
at rewalls, and passes though Network Address Translation
[40℄ without problems.
The oin tossing on the nodes makes the autosubmits
terminate after two repetitions, in the mean. For a xed
message size of four kilobytes, the resulting tra for the
lient is about the same as that for a banner advertisement
(typially 16 kb).
7. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS AND DIREC-
TIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Although the idea of a mix network with an enlarged
anonymity set seems promising, a number of open problems
and possible enhanements must be disussed.
Do aknowledgements (or lak thereof) introdue new points
of attak? If a node does not reeive an ACK for a message,
it will re-send the message at some later time. The repeat-
ing pattern marks it as being a message as opposed to an
ACK or randomness.
User behaviour inuenes the timing of message delivery.
This ould lead to a Trikle [39℄ attak. To redue this inu-
ene, a node ould send randomness of appropriate size to
a randomly hosen node, if a lient onnets but the node's
bathing strategy does not dispath a message from the pool.
This would allow reuse of most of the known pooling algo-
rithms.
The time a message spends in the mix network before nal
delivery is dependent on external fators, namely the whims
and inlinations of unknown web surfers, and the willingness
of website maintainers (linkers) to plae links to the nodes
on their pages. Should all the linker's pages beome unpop-
ular at some point, ommuniation would stop entirely.
One way around this problem would be to ombine the
mix network with an Internet advertising ompany. The
advertisements (plaed in IFRAMEs) would show ads while
at the same time transporting data between the dierent
servers of the advertising ompany. If ookies are used as
the hannel of ommuniation, it would not be notieably
dierent from what Doublelik In. is doing now [14℄.
Can we ahieve unobservability against a global observer
who inspets omplete data payloads, instead of just the
headers? Universal reenryption [23℄ oers a solution.
In universal reenryption, a third party (the unwitting
lients, in our ase) an hange the random fator in a prob-
abilisti publi key enryption, and the following properties
hold:
1. The third party does not need to know the publi key
with whih the message is enrypted.
2. For two given enrypted messages, after reenryption,
an adversary annot tell whih of the outputs orre-
sponds to whih original enryption.
In [23℄, P. Golle et al. show how universal reenryption
an be implemented with ElGamal and a publi (Group,
Generator) pair. They also show how reenryption an be
extended to hybrid enryption shemes, where the publi
key sheme is used to enrypt a session key and the message
itself is enrypted with a symmetri ipher and the session
key.
Unfortunately, JavaSript has no builtin funtions for
arithmeti of large numbers nor symmetri iphers, and im-
plemented in JavaSript, they would be extremely slow.
Java, however, oers the math.BigInteger and SeureRandom
lasses neessary for implementing the reenryption algo-
rithm. Inonsistent with the seurity requirements of Java,
standard browser implementations allow JavaSript to all
publi methods and variables of Java objets. JavaSript in
turn an be used to submit the reenrypted message to the
next node, as in the protool above.
The global observer would see a randomlooking message
delivered to the lient and another randomlooking message
from the lient to the next node. Beause of the properties
of ElGamal (and the symmetri ipher in the ase of hybrid
enryption), the observer annot distinguish real messages
from randomness. Beause of the properties of universal re
enryption, she an only guess whether the outgoing message
is a reenryption of the reeived one or a ompletely new
message substituted by the lient. Inspetion of the HTTP
body does not help to distinguish senders and reeivers from
unwitting web surfers.
Universal reenryption also remedies the problem of re-
peated messages, mentioned above. The node would re
enrypt the message in the pool before sending, so that ob-
servable messages are always dierent.
8. SUMMARY
Privay is of growing onern for users of the Internet's
servies. Existing privay enhaning tehnologies an assure
anonymity only if the anonymity set is suiently large.
In most urrent protools, the size of the anonyity set is
bounded by the number of the ative users of a protool.
After dening a reasonable adversary model, we showed how
the anonymity set of a protool an be enlarged by having
nonpartiipants generate over tra. We presented new
overt hannels in the most widespread protool on the
Internet, the HyperText Transfer Protool, and proeeded
to desribe a simple Chaumian mix based on CGI sripts,
in whih the anonymity set onsist of senders, reeivers and
unknowing partiipants, thereby enhaning anonymity for
the senders and reeivers. We explained remaining problems
of our protool and suggested areas for future researh.
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